

CROSS-BORDER MISINFORMATION AND COUNTER-FRAMING: INDIA-LINKED FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT BANGLADESH AND ONLINE COUNTER-RESPONSES, 5 AUGUST 2024 TO 11 FEBRUARY 2026

SINIR ÖTESİ DEZENFORMASYON VE KARŞI ÇERÇEVELEME: BANGLADEŞ HAKKINDA HİNDİSTAN BAĞLANTILI ASILSIZ İDDİALAR VE ÇEVİRİMİÇİ KARŞI TEPKİLER, 5 AĞUSTOS 2024 – 11 ŞUBAT 2026

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ABSTRACT

The collapse of Sheikh Hasina's government on 5 August 2024 created an information vacuum that was quickly filled by cross-border actors. This study examines India-linked false and misleading claims about Bangladesh that circulated through Indian media and social media networks between 5 August 2024 and 11 February 2026, the eve of the general election, and the responses of Bangladeshi online actors. Using qualitative framing analysis and descriptive content coding of 83 verified corpus items, the study identifies six dominant misinformation frames. The most prevalent frame was communal persecution, accounting for 42.2% of the corpus and 35 items. It portrayed Bangladesh as a space of Hindu victimhood through misidentified victims, recycled images, and AI-generated content. Other frames targeted state legitimacy (20.5%, 17 items), security and sovereignty (12.0%, 10 items), media censorship (7.2%, 6 items), bilateral cultural hostility, and election-period synthetic media (8.4%, 7 items). Drawing on Entman's framing theory, Pan and Kosicki's news-discourse approach, and Miskimmon et al.'s strategic narrative framework, the study argues that these claims operated as a coordinated epistemic strategy rather than isolated falsehoods. Bangladeshi counter-framers, including Rumor Scanner, Dismislab, AFP Fact Check, and BSS, used five identifiable counter-strategies that contributed to epistemic repair in an asymmetric information environment.

Keywords: Bangladesh, India, Misinformation, Counter-framing, Fact-checking

ÖZ

Şeyh Hasina hükümetinin 5 Ağustos 2024'te çöküşü, sınır ötesi aktörlerce hızla kullanılabilecek bir bilgi boşluğu yaratmıştır. Bu çalışma, 5 Ağustos 2024 ile genel seçim arifesi olan 11 Şubat 2026 arasında Hindistan medyası ve sosyal medya ağları üzerinden dolaşıma giren, Bangladeş'e ilişkin Hindistan bağlantılı yanlış ve yanıltıcı iddiaları ile Bangladeşli çevrimiçi aktörlerin bu iddialara verdiği yanıtları incelemektedir. 83 doğrulanmış külliyat ögesi üzerinde yürütülen nitel çerçeveleme analizi ve betimsel içerik kodlamasına dayanan çalışma, altı baskın yanlış bilgi çerçevesini belirlemektedir. En yaygın çerçeve, külliyatın %42,2'sini oluşturan 35 ögeyle komünal zulüm çerçevesidir. Bu çerçeve Bangladeş'i yanlış tanımlanan mağdurlar, yeniden kullanılan görseller ve yapay zekâ ürünü içerikler aracılığıyla Hindu mağduriyetinin mekânı olarak sunmuştur. Diğer çerçeveler devlet meşruiyetini (%20,5, 17 öge), güvenlik ve egemenliği (%12,0, 10 öge), medya sansürünü (%7,2, 6 öge), ikili kültürel düşmanlığı ve seçim dönemi sentetik medyayı (%8,4, 7 öge) hedef almıştır. Entman'ın çerçeveleme kuramı, Pan ve Kosicki'nin haber söylemi yaklaşımı ve Miskimmon ve diğerlerinin stratejik anlatı çerçevesinden hareketle, çalışma bu iddiaların münferit yanlışlıklardan ziyade koordineli bir epistemik strateji olarak işlediğini savunmaktadır. Rumor Scanner, Dismislab, AFP Fact Check ve BSS dâhil olmak üzere Bangladeşli karşı-çerçeveleyiciler, asimetrik bir bilgi ortamında epistemik onarıma katkı sağlayan 5 tanımlanabilir karşı-strateji kullanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bangladeş, Hindistan, Yanlış bilgi, Karşı-çerçeveleme, Doğrulama gazeteciliği

INTRODUCTION

The July 2024 uprising reshaped Bangladesh's political order and changed its media environment. After weeks of student-led protest, state violence, internet shutdowns, and mass mobilisation, Sheikh Hasina resigned on 5 August 2024 and left for India (Congressional Research Service, 2026; Ranjan, 2024). A new interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, took office during a sensitive transition (Alam, 2024a; Reuters, 2024b). This opening created space for democratic reform, but it also produced uncertainty, fear, and a wide information gap. Claims about minority safety, anti-India sentiment, alleged Pakistan links, media censorship, and the stability of the interim government then moved quickly across national borders (Alam, 2024b; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2024; Reuters, 2025b).

This paper studies cross-border misinformation through online news and fact-checking evidence. It asks two main questions: how was Bangladesh framed in false or misleading Indian media and India-linked online narratives after 5 August 2024, and how did Bangladesh-facing verification actors respond? The focus is not limited to one fact-checking organisation. The evidence base includes Rumor Scanner, Dismislab, Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), Chief Adviser's Press Wing reports, FactWatch, Newschecker Bangladesh, BOOM, Agence France-Presse (AFP) Fact Check, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Verify, and selected online news reports (see Appendix A).

For clarity, this study uses the term India-linked misinformation in an operational sense, not as an accusation. An item is considered India-linked only if it meets at least one clear criterion. It may be published by an Indian media outlet, amplified by an India-based or India-facing social media account, or framed through Indian minority, security, or bilateral political discourse. It may also be identified by a fact-checking source as part of an Indian media or platform circulation chain. This category does not mean that all criticism of Bangladesh from India is misinformation. It also does not claim that misinformation came only from outside Bangladesh.

The position of this paper needs to be clear. The study does not deny real violence or real insecurity. After the fall of the previous government, credible reports documented attacks on Hindu homes, businesses, and temples. They also reported minority fear, protests, and a weak law-and-order situation in which police absence or limited police activity reduced state capacity in several areas (Ahmed & Ahmed, 2024; Amnesty International, 2025; Dieterich, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024; Reuters, 2024a). The analytical question is different. It asks how real instability was mixed with false videos, misidentified victims, old images, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated clips, and strategic exaggeration. The paper studies misinformation about the crisis; it does not argue that the crisis did not exist.

The analysis period runs from 5 August 2024 to 11 February 2026. This endpoint captures the full Yunus-led interim government period and includes the election-related disinformation wave documented by fact-checkers in early 2026. The search was updated in May 2026 to identify additional open, retrievable items within the study window. The final coded sample contains 83 online items listed in Appendix A.

The central argument is that India-linked misinformation about Bangladesh moved through three main narrative routes after the uprising. The first was a communal route that framed Bangladesh as a space of Hindu victimhood. The second was a legitimacy route that framed Dr. Yunus and the interim government as unstable or anti-India. The third was a security route that framed Bangladesh as a geopolitical threat linked to Pakistan or anti-India realignment. Bangladesh-facing counter-framing did more than say that these claims were false. It tried to change their meaning by restoring date, place, actor, motive, evidence, and political context. This process is analysed here as epistemic repair.

The study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, it connects information disorder, framing, strategic narrative, counter-framing, and epistemic repair within a single crisis-based framework. Empirically, it maps how Bangladesh-facing verification actors responded to India-linked claims. It also treats official rebuttals as one evidence category, not as automatic proof.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature for this study comes from five related fields: information disorder, framing theory, strategic narrative, fact-checking scholarship, and Bangladesh-India relations. These fields are reviewed together because the issue is not only about journalism. It is also about regional political communication.

1.1. Information Disorder and Cross-Border Misinformation

Research on information disorder helps explain why false claims travel quickly during a crisis. Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) distinguish misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation based on falsity, intention, and harm. This distinction is useful here because many claims were not fully fabricated. Some used a real event but removed its context, changed the identities of the victims, or placed an old video within a new political frame. For consistency, this study uses “misinformation” as the primary term. It uses disinformation only when the cited source indicates intent or coordinated manipulation. It also uses false or misleading claims when the evidence proves inaccuracy but does not prove intent. Tandoc et al. (2018) identify seven types of fake news, while Kalsnes (2018) reviews competing definitions. Jack (2017) maps a broader vocabulary of problematic information, and Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019) separate the label ‘fake news’ from the phenomenon. McNair (2018) places fake news within a wider crisis of journalistic authority.

The wider literature shows that misinformation spreads not only because audiences lack information, but also because audiences cannot evaluate information. False content often aligns with emotions, group identity, and political interests. Vosoughi et al. (2018) found that false news spread faster than true news on Twitter, partly because false stories carry novelty and emotional charge. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) show that social media platforms create strong incentives for the rapid diffusion of false news. Bakir and McStay (2018) theorise the emotional economy of fake news, while Lazer et al. (2018) argue that platforms, networks, and political incentives shape the spread of misinformation. Guess et al. (2019) find that fake news dissemination on Facebook is nonetheless concentrated among a small

share of users, and Pennycook and Rand (2019) demonstrate that susceptibility is better explained by lack of analytical reasoning than by partisan motivation. At the platform and infrastructure level, Benkler et al. (2018) trace how network propaganda operates through partisan media ecosystems, and Bradshaw and Howard (2019) document globally organised social media manipulation. Woolley and Howard (2018) examine computational propaganda and its political deployment, while Marwick and Lewis (2017) analyse media manipulation techniques used by online actors. Bennett and Livingston (2018) connect disinformation to the decline of democratic institutions. Freelon and Wells (2020) frame disinformation as political communication with strategic objectives, and Jungherr and Schroeder (2021) situate disinformation within structural transformations of the public arena. Cross-border misinformation adds a further layer: a claim about Hindu persecution in Bangladesh could mobilise outrage in India, amplify communal fear within Bangladesh, and challenge the legitimacy of the interim government internationally. (Alam, 2024b; Chadwick, 2017; Reuters, 2025b).

This case also fits wider debates on networked propaganda, computational propaganda, cross-border influence operations, and digital nationalism. Networked propaganda explains how partisan media ecosystems and platform publics can support each other across institutional boundaries (Benkler et al., 2018). Computational propaganda highlights organised social media manipulation, platform design, and coordinated amplification (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Woolley & Howard, 2018). Digital nationalism is relevant because many claims in this corpus turned national identity, border anxiety, religion, and sovereignty into emotional online narratives (Mihelj & Jimenez-Martinez, 2021). These concepts show why the Bangladesh-India case is not only about false information. It is also a struggle over regional identity, legitimacy, and narrative authority.

1.2. Framing Theory, Strategic Narratives, and Counter-Framing

Framing theory explains how media texts select aspects of reality and make them more visible. The concept originates with Goffman (1974), whose work on the organisation of experience established the idea

that interpretive frames structure perception. Gitlin (1980) applied the concept of framing to mass media, showing how news organisations impose persistent patterns of cognition and presentation. Entman (1993) argues that frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, and suggest remedies. Scheufele (1999) provides a systematic theory of framing as a media-effects mechanism, and Chong and Druckman (2007) review the conditions under which framing effects occur. Reese et al. (2001) examine framing across a wide range of public life contexts, and de Vreese (2005) distinguishes generic from issue-specific frames in news production. In the present context, a false claim may define Bangladesh as a place of communal collapse, diagnose the cause as Islamist power, judge the interim government as complicit, and imply a need for Indian or international intervention. The same event may be counter-framed by Bangladeshi outlets as political revenge, a local crime, or deliberately manipulated content. Pan and Kosicki (1993) operationalise framing through headlines, leads, source selection, syntax, and rhetorical devices - tools directly applicable to reading online news.

Strategic narrative theory is relevant because misinformation rarely operates in isolation. Miskimmon et al. (2013) argue that political actors use narratives to shape how audiences understand international order, identity, and policy. A single false video can therefore contribute to a larger story about Bangladesh as unsafe for minorities, hostile to India, or captured by Islamist forces. Counter-framing, following Benford and Snow (2000) and Snow and Benford (1988) it is the effort to challenge an existing frame and provide an alternative diagnosis, moral meaning, and implied remedy.

1.3. Fact-Checking, Verification, and Epistemic Repair

Fact-checking has become a prominent institutional response to misinformation. Graves (2016) shows that fact-checkers aim to create a public method for determining what is true, and Graves and Cherubini (2016) document the growth of dedicated fact-checking sites across European media systems. Silverman (2015) traces the mechanics of viral misinformation and the structural challenges that

make it profitable to spread lies. Waisbord (2018) argues that factual journalism must contend with a fragmented public epistemology that complicates simple correction. In this study, the verification ecology is described as Bangladesh-facing rather than purely Bangladeshi because it includes local fact-checkers, Bangladeshi newsrooms, official or institutional rebuttals, and international fact-checking actors that verified Bangladesh-related claims. This distinction avoids overstating the national identity or neutrality of all counter-framers.

Research also identifies significant limits to fact-checking. Nyhan and Reifler (2010) show that corrections may not consistently change beliefs, particularly when misinformation aligns with strong political identity. Lewandowsky et al. (2012) explain the continued influence effect, where corrected falsehoods may persist in memory. Pennycook and Rand (2019) find that susceptibility to misinformation is driven more by a failure to apply analytical reasoning than by partisan motivation. For these reasons, this study uses epistemic repair as an analytical term for restoring damaged public knowledge through evidence, chronology, source accountability, identity correction, and interpretive balance. The term does not mean that correction fully removes the original false impression; it describes the public work of rebuilding verifiable meaning after misinformation has damaged the record.

1.4. Bangladesh-India Relations, Identity, and Media Narratives

Bangladesh-India relations are shaped by geography, history, water agreements, trade, migration, border security, domestic politics, and the legacy of 1971. Academic work on Bangladesh shows that identity and foreign policy often interact with internal political competition (Jalal, 1995; Lewis, 2011; Riaz, 2016; Riaz & Rahman, 2016). Mohsin (2003) shows how religion, politics, and regional security make Bangladesh-India relations sensitive. The post-2024 transition added new diplomatic pressure. India had maintained close ties with the Hasina government, and Hasina's flight to India made that earlier closeness a direct source of mistrust in post-uprising politics (Bhattacharya, 2025; Congressional Research Service, 2026; Ellis-Petersen, 2024;

International Crisis Group, 2025; Reuters, 2025b). Minority safety became a bilateral and diplomatic concern. At the same time, Hasina's extradition, judicial accountability, sovereignty, and India's perceived role in sustaining the previous regime entered Bangladesh's public and diplomatic debate (Alam, 2024a, 2024b; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2024; Reuters, 2024c, 2025a, 2025b). The International Crisis Group (2025) documented a sharp decline in Bangladesh-India ties after the August 2024 uprising. It also showed how this setting allowed false narratives to work as political tools. In this context, misinformation proved highly useful because false claims could address real anxieties even when the evidence was fabricated or distorted (Datta, 2008; Pattanaik, 2005).

The literature on news values helps explain why such claims attracted sustained attention. Galtung and Ruge (1965) argue that conflict, negativity, elite actors, and cultural proximity increase newsworthiness. Tuchman (1978) shows that news routines construct reality in ways that favour dramatic and easily categorised events, and Schudson (2003) analyses how institutional and social forces shape the sociology of news production. A claim about attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh contains religion, border proximity, conflict, and moral drama - fitting the logic of attention even before verification begins.

1.5. Research Gap

Journalism and fact-checking have documented many false claims about Bangladesh since the July uprising. However, much of this work is still mostly descriptive. A study is needed that moves from verification to interpretation and explains how claims work as frames and strategic narratives. A second gap concerns institutional diversity. Public discussion often focuses on Rumor Scanner, but Bangladesh now has a broader fact-checking ecology. A third gap is theoretical. The interaction among information disorder, framing, strategic narrative, and counter-framing has not been studied enough in the Bangladesh-India context. Humprecht et al. (2019) show that media-system structure matters for resilience to disinformation. Chadwick (2017) shows that the hybrid media system shapes how misinformation gains institutional amplification.

Bennett et al. (2007) show that political power shapes what news media cover and what they ignore. This study addresses these gaps by treating verification as frame contestation. It shows how false claims gain political force through repeated narrative routes and how counter-framing tries to repair damaged public meaning, not only correct isolated errors.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework uses four concepts: information disorder, framing, strategic narrative, and epistemic repair. Misinformation does not work only because it is false. It works because it selects a problem, assigns blame, creates emotion, and offers a political meaning. Counter-framing does not work by simply saying something is false. It works by changing the problem definition, the evidence base, and the moral conclusion.

The first component is information disorder. Wardle and Derakhshan's model separates agent, message, and interpreter. In this study, agents include Indian news outlets, India-based social media accounts, political influencers, anonymous pages, and reposters. Messages include old videos, misleading photographs, AI-generated voice clips, fabricated documents, false headlines, fake photocards, and misidentified victims. Interpreters include Bangladeshi readers, Indian audiences, diaspora users, journalists, official sources, and international observers.

The second component is framing. Entman's (1993, 2004) four functions - problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation - serve as the analytical guide for what a frame does. Pan and Kosicki's (1993) news-discourse approach supports the operational reading of how a frame is built through headlines, leads, source selection, syntax, rhetorical cues, and visual evidence. A false claim about a burning building may define the problem as Hindu persecution, diagnose the cause as Islamist violence, render a moral judgement against Bangladesh, and imply external pressure. A Bangladeshi counter-frame may show that the building was not a temple, that the video was recorded elsewhere or earlier, or that the incident was political rather than communal.

The third component is strategic narrative.

Miskimmon et al. (2013) show that political actors use narratives to shape how audiences understand international order, identity, and policy. Individual claims, organised into a larger story about Bangladesh as unsafe, unstable, anti-India, and geopolitically threatening, carry more political weight than isolated items. The fourth component is epistemic repair: the effort to restore the public record through evidence, context, source accountability, and interpretive balance, while acknowledging that corrections may not reach all audiences or fully displace the original false impression.

The framework, therefore, reads each corpus item at two levels. At the content level, it asks what claim is false or misleading. At the frame-construction level, it asks how the claim organises meaning through headline logic, lexical labels, visual evidence, source attribution, temporal placement, and implied remedy. This prevents the analysis from becoming only thematic counting and keeps the focus on how misinformation becomes a politically usable frame.

The specific contribution of this framework is to treat verification as counter-framing rather than merely a technical correction. In this reading, a fact-check repairs the public record by showing who acted, where the event happened, when it happened, what evidence supports the claim, and what political meaning can or cannot be drawn from it.

Figure 1. Theoretical Pathway: From Misinformation to Epistemic Repair



Source: Author's theoretical construction based on Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), Entman (1993, 2004), Pan and Kosicki (1993), Miskimmon et al. (2013), Lewandowsky et al. (2012), and Nyhan and Reifler (2010).

Table 1. Operational Pathway from Theory to Coding

Theory Concept	Meaning in This Study	Coding Indicator	Analytical Use
Information disorder	False, misleading, altered, or harmful information in a crisis	Claim type, platform, verification status	Separates old video, AI content, fake document, wrong identity, and misleading context
Framing	Selection of a problem and its moral meaning	Headline, lead, lexical choices, victim labels, source selection, visual cues, and implied remedy	Shows not only which category a claim belongs to, but also how Bangladesh is constructed as unsafe, unstable, anti-India, or geopolitically threatening
Strategic narrative	Larger political story constructed from repeated claims	Repeated themes across claims	Explains why many separate claims converge on legitimacy, identity, or security narratives
Counter-framing	Challenge to a dominant false frame	Correction, official rebuttal, source re-identification	Shows how Bangladeshi actors rebuild meaning through evidence and context
Epistemic repair	Restoration of damaged public knowledge	Proof, archival, and reverse search, official confirmation	Explains the practical role and limits of verification work

Source: Author's analytical framework.

3. METHODOLOGY

This study uses qualitative framing analysis supported by descriptive content coding. The unit of analysis is an open and retrievable online item that verifies, reports, rebuts, or contextualises a false or misleading claim about Bangladesh from 5 August 2024 to 11 February 2026. The sample was built through purposive online searching, source chaining from fact-check reports, and a review of Bangladesh-related fact-checking archives. Search terms included Bangladesh, India, misinformation, Hindu, Sanatani, minority, Yunus, interim government, Pakistan, media censorship, election, AI video, fake photocard, and false claim. These terms were not used to predetermine the findings. They were first developed from early fact-check archives and then expanded through source chaining as repeated claim clusters appeared. The search was updated in May 2026 to identify additional open items within the study window.

To support reproducibility, the study reports the study window, major search terms, source-chaining process, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and item-level metadata in Appendix A. Duplicate reports were treated as part of the same claim cluster. They were not counted again unless a new source added a distinct claim, frame, or evidence type.

Operational definition and inclusion criteria: An item was coded as India-linked when it met at least one operational criterion. It had to be published by an Indian media outlet, amplified by an India-based or India-facing social media account, connected to Indian minority, security, border, or bilateral political discourse, or identified by a fact-checking source as circulating through Indian media or platform networks. Items were excluded if they were general Bangladeshi-origin rumours without a traceable India link, unverifiable allegations without correction or evidence, inaccessible posts, duplicate reposts of the same claim cluster, or opinion commentary without a specific false or misleading claim.

The term India-linked is therefore narrower than India-related. India-related content may simply mention India or Bangladesh-India relations; India-linked misinformation, as used here, requires a documented circulation, amplification, or framing connection.

This distinction prevents the main concept from becoming vague or politically overextended.

The evidence base has two layers. The first is the coded analytical corpus: 83 open and retrievable online items listed in Appendix A. These include fact-check reports, verification reports, BSS/press-wing rebuttals, and online news stories that report or contextualise verified false or misleading claims. Appendix A reports the item ID, source, date, claim, dominant analytical role, evidence type, and retrieval link. The second layer consists of academic and policy references used to ground the theoretical and literature reviews. These sources are listed in the References section and are not counted as coded misinformation items. This separation prevents over-counting and clarifies which findings come from coded items and which sources provide conceptual background. Appendices A and B also allow readers to trace the movement from source identification to inclusion decision, coding category, frame assignment, and interpretation.

The coded sample is purposive, not random. It captures repeated and politically meaningful misinformation themes rather than every online post. For this reason, all percentages are descriptive shares within the coded corpus. They should not be read as population estimates or statistically representative measures of the wider misinformation universe. That wider universe is larger. Rumor Scanner reported at least 148 India-linked instances in 2024 and 155 in 2025, covering 137 false reports across 72 Indian media outlets in 2024 and 140 false reports across 73 outlets in 2025 (Figure 3). These aggregate numbers are used only as background indicators of scale.

Coding proceeded in two stages. In Stage 1, each item was coded for date, source, platform, claim topic, claim type, target actor, India-link criterion, and verification outcome. In Stage 2, each item was coded for dominant misinformation frame, frame-construction cues, counter-frame, evidence type, and theoretical meaning. The broad coding categories were deductive, derived from information disorder, framing theory, strategic narrative, and fact-checking literature. Subcategories were refined inductively during close reading when repeated patterns, such as identity relabelling, old footage recirculation, fake photocards, AI-generated voice or video, and

official-looking forged documents, appeared across several items.

Coding was conducted by the author as a single-coder qualitative study. For this reason, no intercoder reliability coefficient is reported, and the study does not claim the kind of coder reliability expected from multi-coder quantitative content analysis. Instead, methodological rigor is strengthened through a transparent codebook, repeated reading, claim-cluster coding, source-chain checking, and a coding memo or audit trail. The audit trail recorded the item number, original claim, verification source, India-link criterion, frame decision, counter-frame decision, and notes on difficult coding choices.

To reduce arbitrary interpretation, the author first pilot-coded 10 items from different topic categories and then refined the codebook before coding the full corpus. Ambiguous items were revisited after the full corpus had been read, so similar cases could be treated consistently. When one item could fit more than one frame, the dominant frame was assigned according to the main problem definition and moral meaning of the claim. Secondary meanings were noted in the coding memo.

Frame and strategic narrative analysis followed Entman's four functions, Pan and Kosicki's news-discourse approach, and Miskimmon et al.'s strategic narrative framework. Each item was examined for how the problem was defined, what cause was implied, what moral judgement was made, and what remedy or political response was suggested. The analysis also considered headlines, word choices, victim and perpetrator labels, visual or audiovisual evidence, source selection, official-looking documents, and timing. Repeated claim clusters were then read as larger narratives about minority safety, state legitimacy, anti-India hostility, and Pakistan/security anxiety. This is why the study treats frame analysis as more than topic sorting. The main question is not only what the claim was about, but how the claim made Bangladesh appear unsafe, unstable, anti-India, or geopolitically threatening.

The study also treats counter-framers carefully. Fact-checkers, newsrooms, and official press actors are not assumed to be neutral simply because they correct misinformation. BSS and the Chief Adviser's Press

Wing are coded as institutional rebuttal actors, not as final arbiters of truth. Their claims are analytically stronger when they are supported by independent fact-checkers, original documents, reverse-image evidence, police or source confirmation, archive checks, or platform-level verification. This triangulation rule is necessary because official communication can also carry political interests in a polarised transition.

The study has three limitations. First, it cannot measure the full reach, engagement, or audience effect of each claim. Second, it cannot establish the intent of every actor who circulated the content. Third, because the sample is purposive and single-coded, the percentages should be read as within-corpus descriptors that support qualitative interpretation rather than statistical generalisation.

Table 2. *Corpus Structure*


Corpus Layer	Number	Used For	Counted in the sample?
Coded analytical corpus	83	Frame and counter-frame analysis of verified false or misleading claims	Yes
Formal academic and policy references	55	Theoretical, conceptual, historical, and literature-review grounding	No
Wider aggregate evidence (Rumor Scanner)	148 (2024) / 155 (2025)	Background scale indicator of India-linked misinformation ecosystem	No - scale indicator only

Source: Author's corpus construction.


Table 3. Topic Distribution of the Coded Corpus

Topic Category	Items (n)	Share within coded corpus	Main Analytical Meaning
Minority, Sanatani, and Hindu persecution claims	35	42.2%	Largest category: transformed crisis events, political revenge, and local crime into communal persecution narratives
Dr. Yunus and the interim government's legitimacy	17	20.5%	Targeted leadership, health, resignation, foreign control, anti-India positions, and state capacity
Security, sovereignty, and geopolitics	10	12.0%	Linked Bangladesh to Pakistan, militancy, military alignment, territorial maps, or anti-India threat
Election and AI-driven political process claims	7	8.4%	Used AI, fake documents, false postponement claims, or manipulated videos near the election period
Media, censorship, and anti-India claims	6	7.2%	Claimed Indian channels were banned, journalists targeted, or media freedom collapsed.
Hasina, Awami League, and transition violence	5	6.0%	Used old or unrelated content to misrepresent post-uprising revenge, party violence, or opposition narratives
Sport, symbol, and cultural tension	3	3.6%	Used cricket, the national flag, a Gandhi bust, or cultural symbols to widen bilateral hostility.
Total	83	100%	


Source: Author's coding of the analytical corpus.

Figure 2. Topic Distribution within the Coded Misinformation Corpus (n = 83)


Source: Author's analysis of the coded corpus.

Figure 3. Scale of India-Linked Misinformation Documented by Rumor Scanner (2024-2025)


Source: Rumor Scanner reports [A1] and [A2].

Figure 4. Source Composition of the Coded Analytical Corpus (n = 83)


Source: Author's analysis of the coded corpus.

4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The findings show that the misinformation field was not random. It was organised around repeated frames that highlighted sensitive aspects of Bangladesh's political transition and gave them broader political meanings. Within the coded corpus, the frame hierarchy is clear. Communal persecution accounts for 35 items, legitimacy attack for 17 items, security and sovereignty for 10 items, election-period manipulation for 7 items, media censorship for 6 items, transition violence for 5 items, and cultural tension for 3 items. The first three categories together account for 62 of 83 items, or 74.7% of the coded corpus. These numbers are descriptive, not representative population estimates, but they show where the strongest narrative pressure appeared.

4.1. The Communal Persecution Frame: The Dominant Misinformation Narrative

The largest category, comprising 35 of 83 items or 42.2% within the coded corpus, concerned religious minorities, particularly Hindus, Sanatani groups, temples, monks, Hindu leaders, and alleged communal attacks. The frame was not built from a single type of falsehood. It combined incorrect identity claims, outdated or unrelated visuals, misleading captions, AI-generated content, and the conversion of political or local incidents into communal claims. The core narrative was emotionally direct: post-uprising Bangladesh was presented as a place where Hindus faced systematic persecution.

The frame was constructed through several recurring textual and visual techniques. First, victims were re-identified through religious category: Muslim victims or politically targeted individuals were relabelled as Hindus. Second, old videos or images from India, Nepal, Indonesia, Myanmar, or earlier events in Bangladesh were embedded within the post-uprising timeline. Third, AI-generated or manipulated audiovisuals created an impression of direct testimony, particularly in claims featuring a Hindu woman appearing to appeal for help from India (corpus item A71). Fourth, individual incidents were attached to sweeping lexical labels such as Hindu persecution, minority collapse, temple attack, or genocide-style threat. These labels compressed different kinds of evidence into a single moral story.

Applying Entman's (1993) framework, this frame defined the problem as communal persecution, diagnosed the cause as Islamist violence or state failure, rendered a moral judgement that Bangladesh was unsafe for minorities, and implied a need for Indian or international response. Bangladeshi counter-framing challenged this construction by separating date, place, identity, motive, and evidence. The stronger counter-frame acknowledged that fear and violence existed while distinguishing verified attacks from viral exaggeration, misidentification, old footage, and communal labelling. This distinction is analytically important because it separates real vulnerability from manipulated communal interpretation.

For example, item A65 shows how a restaurant fire was captioned as a Hindu temple attack, while items A54 and A60 show how gendered victimhood was used when women were falsely presented as Hindu victims of communal violence. Item A71 adds a newer technological layer because an AI-generated appeal video made the frame appear as direct testimony. These examples show that the communal frame was constructed through a chain of evidence distortion: place was changed, identity was relabelled, time was shifted, and emotion was intensified.

4.2. The Legitimacy Attack Frame: Targeting Dr. Yunus and the Interim Government

The second major category, comprising 17 of 83 items or 20.5% within the coded corpus, directly targeted Dr. Muhammad Yunus and the interim government. Claims included fake resignation letters, false health claims, manipulated videos, fabricated photocards attributed to mainstream newspapers, falsified foreign praise, unfounded anti-India policy claims, and narratives of administrative collapse. Unlike the communal frame, which focused mainly on victimhood, the legitimacy frame focused on institutional authority and asked whether the interim government was stable, credible, and internationally acceptable.

The legitimacy frame was constructed through the appearance of authority: official-looking documents, newspaper-style photocards, edited video, invented diplomatic signals, and source attributions that made fabricated claims appear institutionally grounded. The

counter-frame relied on document authentication, AI detection, source comparison, and official rebuttal. BSS reports from the Chief Adviser's Press Wing, FactWatch, AFP Fact Check, and Newschecker Bangladesh corrected fabricated documents and manipulated videos. In this study, official rebuttal is treated as one form of evidence, and its analytical weight increases when it is supported by independent verification or documentary comparison.

Concrete examples show how this frame uses institutional-looking evidence. Item A49 involved a fake resignation letter attributed to Dr. Yunus, item A51 used a fabricated Prothom Alo-style photocard, item A44 used a manipulated Trump video, and item A55 relied on an AI-generated statement attributed to Donald Trump. The repeated technique was to borrow the authority of recognisable institutions, documents, or foreign leaders to make fabricated claims appear politically credible.

4.3. The Security and Sovereignty Frame: Geopolitical Threat Narratives

A third cluster, comprising 10 of 83 items (12.0%) within the coded corpus, framed Bangladesh as a security threat or as a state drifting into Pakistan's orbit. Examples included claims about Pakistani generals attending meetings with Bangladeshi officials, alleged ISI links, reports of Turkish tanks, a fabricated Greater Bangladesh map, and cross-border military narratives. This frame relied on strategic fear rather than only factual falsity: it suggested that Bangladesh's political transition could become a regional security problem for India.

For example, item A56 reframed Bangladeshi police officials as Pakistani generals, while items A11 and A36 used the Greater Bangladesh map claim to connect Bangladesh's transition with territorial and geopolitical suspicion. These examples show how the security frame was built through source misidentification, map symbolism, Pakistan-coded language, and the suggestion of hidden military alignment.

4.4. The Media Censorship Frame: Bilateral Media Conflict Claims

Another category, comprising 6 of 83 items, or 7.2% of the coded corpus, claimed that the interim

government was censoring the media, banning Indian television channels, or systematically targeting journalists. This frame was smaller in number than the communal, legitimacy, and security frames, but it carried a specific political function: it presented Bangladesh as institutionally hostile to India and hostile to media freedom.

Item A67 is especially useful here because it shows how a legal or public policy discussion can be transformed into a completed hostile act. The misinformation frame did not merely claim that a debate existed; it implied that Bangladesh had already taken an anti-India media decision.

4.5. Election-Period Misinformation and Synthetic Media

The period leading up to the February 2026 election introduced a more technically sophisticated synthetic-media problem, comprising 7 of 83 items or 8.4% within the coded corpus. AFP Fact Check and Dismislab documented AI-generated images, fabricated videos, synthetic voice clips, and manipulated campaign narratives. Although this category is numerically smaller, it is analytically important because it shows a temporal shift from retrospective misinformation about the August 2024 transition to anticipatory misinformation about the credibility, violence, and fairness of the upcoming election.

Items A42, A76, and A81 illustrate the anticipatory nature of this frame: one circulated a false claim about election postponement, one involved an AI-generated political-plot video, and one presented a scripted video as real election violence. Together, they show how election misinformation can prepare audiences to expect a crisis before verified events occur.

4.6. Patterns of Counter-Framing in Bangladeshi Online Media

Across the full corpus, five counter-framing strategies were identified. The first was a factual correction, where the source showed that a specific claim was false. The second was contextual correction, where the event had occurred, but its circulated meaning was different. The third was identity correction, in which religion, profession, or nationality had been incorrectly

labelled. The fourth was temporal correction, where old material was presented as recent. The fifth was technological correction, where AI-generated content or digital manipulation was documented. In practice, strong counter-framing usually combines multiple strategies. For example, one correction could restore the correct date, identify the actual location, verify the original source, and explain how a misleading caption altered the material's political meaning.

This section also avoids treating counter-framers as bias-free actors. Independent fact-checkers, newsrooms, and official sources occupy different institutional positions and may carry different incentives. The analysis, therefore, gives the greatest weight to corrections that provide retrievable evidence, original-source comparison, visual verification, documentary proof, or triangulation across more than one actor. This is particularly important for official rebuttals: BSS and the Chief Adviser's Press Wing are relevant to the corpus, but their claims are treated as institutional evidence that needs contextual reading, not as automatic truth.

Table 4. *Dominant Misinformation Frames and Bangladeshi Counter-Frames*

Misinformation Frame	Typical Claim Logic	Bangladeshi Counter-Frame	Theoretical Meaning
Communal persecution	Bangladesh is systematically unsafe for Hindus and religious minorities	Evidence-based correction; victim and location re-identification; separation of verified violence from communal labelling	Problem definition and moral judgment are challenged at the level of evidence
Legitimacy attack	Dr. Yunus and the interim government are unstable, foreign-controlled, or anti-India	Document verification, official rebuttal, AI detection, comparison with original source	The strategic narrative about state legitimacy is directly contested
Security threat	Bangladesh is moving towards Pakistan, militancy, or anti-India geopolitical realignment	Institutional clarification, defence-policy denial, source verification, map, and video authentication	Strategic fear returned to verifiable factual ground

Misinformation Frame	Typical Claim Logic	Bangladeshi Counter-Frame	Theoretical Meaning
Media censorship	Bangladesh has banned Indian media or is systematically targeting journalism	Legal and procedural context, cable operator confirmation, press-wing rebuttal	Completed hostile-act frame corrected to a pending or entirely false claim
Election manipulation	The election is delayed, controlled, violent, or shaped by AI narratives	Election fact-checking, AI detection, source tracing, proactive platform monitoring	Future-oriented disinformation challenged before consolidating as public belief

Source: Author's frame and counter-frame analysis.

5. DISCUSSION

The findings support the central argument that cross-border misinformation about Bangladesh after the July 2024 uprising primarily operated through frame construction, not solely through false content. A false video or fabricated document was rarely politically neutral. It is usually linked to Bangladesh's political transition to religious insecurity, state weakness, anti-India positioning, or geopolitical threat. This supports Entman's (1993) view that frames define problems, assign causes, make moral judgements, and imply remedies. It also supports the networked propaganda view because claims often moved across platform publics, partisan attention, and media amplification rather than remaining isolated posts (Benkler et al., 2018; Chadwick, 2017; Woolley & Howard, 2018).

The most important empirical finding is the dominance of the communal persecution frame, which makes up 42.2% of the coded corpus. This needs careful interpretation. The study does not deny minority insecurity (Ahmed & Ahmed, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024; Reuters, 2024a). Rather, it shows that real insecurity created a high-risk environment in which false claims could travel quickly. When actual attacks on Hindu homes, temples, or politically targeted people occurred (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Reuters, 2024a), fabricated claims appeared more believable because they matched a wider mood of fear. Misinformation during a political crisis is powerful because it does not need to invent a whole

reality. It can attach false material to a partly real emotional environment.

The link between real violence and false framing is therefore central. When authorities fail to publish credible data on minority protection, investigate attacks promptly, and communicate transparently, the information vacuum persists. In that vacuum, Indian media or social media actors can fill the space with simple and emotional narratives. At the same time, Bangladeshi responses lose credibility if they deny every concern. A stronger counter-frame should acknowledge verified incidents, correct false claims, and, where evidence supports it, distinguish communal motivation from political revenge or local crime (Alam, 2024b; Congressional Research Service, 2026; Reuters, 2025b; Tsfatı et al., 2020).

The legitimacy attack frame shows another important point. Many false claims targeted the symbolic authority of the interim government, not ordinary citizens. Fake resignation letters, manipulated statements, false health claims, and invented anti-India decisions all weakened confidence in the transitional state (Bhattacharya, 2025; Ranjan, 2024). The repeated story was not only that one claim was false. Bangladesh was unstable, unreliable, and dangerous for India after Hasina. Rapid truth-restoration in documents was therefore a key part of counter-framing.

The study also shows that Bangladesh-facing verification has become more diverse. Rumor Scanner remains important because of its broad coverage of Indian media and social media activity. However, the corpus shows that Dismislab, FactWatch, Newschecker Bangladesh, BOOM, AFP Fact Check, BSS, BanglaFact, BBC Verify, and online newsrooms also contributed to counter-framing. Misinformation is a networked problem, so the response also needs a verification network. Civil society, professional newsrooms, state communication channels, and international fact-checkers can play different but complementary roles. Tsfatı et al. (2020) show that mainstream media's handling of misinformation is decisive, as it can either amplify false claims or help correct them.

At the same time, official sources need careful treatment. The Chief Adviser's Press Wing and BSS

are relevant because they produced public rebuttals during the transition. However, this study does not treat official communication as automatically reliable. In contested political settings, official actors may also have reputational and strategic interests. For this reason, official denials are coded as institutional rebuttal evidence. They are interpreted most strongly when they match independent fact-checking, documentary comparison, platform traces, or verifiable source confirmation.

For journalism practice, online newsrooms should avoid repeating sensational claims without verification, even when those claims come from established media in a neighbouring country. Bangladeshi outlets should link fact-check evidence directly inside news reports. For policy, the main lesson is practical: official denial alone is not enough. Government responses should be transparent, evidence-based, and fast. Where possible, they should include documents, verifiable timelines, and police case references. For minority safety, the state should publish regular and disaggregated data that separates confirmed communal violence, political revenge, and local crime.

Limitations: The study is limited by its purposive sample, single-coder design, and reliance on open online material. It cannot estimate the total scale of misinformation, prove intent for every actor, or measure audience effects. The percentages are used only to describe patterns within the coded corpus. The study also recognises that counter-framing actors, including official sources, can carry institutional bias. Their corrections are strongest when supported by independent and verifiable evidence.

CONCLUSION

This study shows that cross-border misinformation about Bangladesh after the July 2024 uprising was not a random collection of rumours. It was organised around repeated frames that connected Bangladesh's political transition to religion, state legitimacy, bilateral tensions, security fears, and electoral uncertainty. The coded corpus of 83 open online items shows that the strongest frame was communal persecution. This was followed by claims targeting Dr. Muhammad Yunus and the interim government, security and sovereignty narratives, media-censorship

claims, and election-period synthetic media. These findings fit Wardle and Derakhshan's information-disorder model and Entman's framing model. They also show why cross-border misinformation should be studied alongside strategic narrative, networked propaganda, computational propaganda, and digital nationalism.

The false claims mattered not only because they were inaccurate. They mattered because they selected a problem, gave it a moral meaning, and placed it inside a larger story about Bangladesh's identity and regional position. Bangladeshi counter-framing tried to reverse that process by restoring evidence, date, location, identity, source, and institutional context. This process of epistemic repair protected the public record, even when it could not fully remove the original false impression (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The main theoretical contribution is the use of epistemic repair as a bridge between fact-checking practice and framing analysis in a cross-border crisis setting.

Future research should extend this study in several directions. A larger multilingual database should include Bangla, English, Hindi, and Bengali-language Indian media content. Network analysis should trace how claims move from social media to mainstream outlets and back. Audience research should examine how Bangladeshi and Indian users interpret corrections. Future studies should also examine misinformation originating inside Bangladesh, including domestic partisan, anti-India, anti-minority, or anti-government narratives. They should ask how those domestic narratives interact with cross-border misinformation. The present study focused on India-linked claims, so it cannot determine whether Bangladesh-originated misinformation was absent, present, or mutually reinforcing. Comparative research across other South Asian bilateral relationships would show whether the patterns found here are specific to Bangladesh-India relations or part of a wider regional information problem.

For policymakers and practitioners, the lesson is practical. Democratic transitions require fast, credible, and transparent information systems. Fact-checkers are essential, but they need support from responsible journalism, open public data, platform

accountability, and careful state communication. Without these structures, fact-checking remains only a partial and reactive response to a systemic and politically motivated problem.

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- Note. All reference-list items containing internet sources and hyperlinks were checked by the author on 6 July 2026 during the revision of this paper.*

APPENDIX A

CODED ANALYTICAL CORPUS AND RETRIEVAL LINKS

Table A1 shows the coded online corpus used in the analysis. The item numbers in the first column (A1-A83) are linked to the original sources, including news reports, fact-checks, rebuttals, and source documents.

Table A1. Coded analytical corpus metadata and coding outcomes

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A1	Rumor Scanner 2025-01-18	Trace of Misinformation About Bangladesh in 72 Indian Media Outlets in 2024	Aggregate context / India-linked media ecosystem	aggregate source mapping; Indian media circulation evidence
A2	Rumor Scanner 2026-01-24	Bangladesh Targeted: 140 Disinformation Across 73 Indian News Outlets	Aggregate context / India-linked media ecosystem	aggregate source mapping; Indian media circulation evidence
A3	Rumor Scanner 2025-01-12	A Record-Breaking 2,919 Cases of Misinformation Identified	Aggregate context / national misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A4	Rumor Scanner 2025	271 Misinformation Cases Detected in January	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A5	Rumor Scanner 2025	268 Misinformation Cases Detected in February	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A6	Rumor Scanner 2025	Rumor Scanner Detects 298 Misinformation Cases in March	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A7	Rumor Scanner 2025	April 2025 Sees 295 Instances of Misinformation in Bangladesh	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A8	Rumor Scanner 2025	Misinformation in Bangladesh: May 2025 Report Reveals Trends	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A9	Rumor Scanner 2025-10-16	Explosion of Political Disinformation in the Third Quarter	Aggregate context / political misinformation trend	aggregate trend evidence
A10	Rumor Scanner 2026-01-01	521 Cases of Misinformation Identified in December	Aggregate context / monthly misinformation scale	aggregate trend evidence
A11	Rumor Scanner 2025-11-02	False claim: Dr. Yunus gifted a map of Bangladesh, including India's Northeast	Security threat	map authentication; source/context verification
A12	Rumor Scanner 2025-04-20	Muslim woman's accident injury photos circulated with a false communal claim	Communal persecution	identity correction; contextual correction
A13	Rumor Scanner 2025-02-19	Fact-check: Viral video claiming acid attack on Hindu girl in Bangladesh is false	Communal persecution	factual correction; video verification
A14	Rumor Scanner 2025-01-26	An old incident video from India was falsely peddled as a Hindu woman raped and killed in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	temporal/visual verification; identity correction
A15	Rumor Scanner 2025-03-25	The Story of an Ongoing Struggle Against Misinformation	Aggregate context / fact-checking practice	fact-checking practice context

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Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
<u>A16</u>	Dismislab 2025-01-21	Misinformation Trends and Narratives in Bangladesh's Tumultuous 2024	Aggregate context / 2024 trend evidence	aggregate trend/narrative mapping
<u>A17</u>	Dismislab 2026-01-29	The Rise of AI, Familiar Faces in Disinformation Headlines, and Unfamiliar Actors Behind the Scenes	Aggregate context / AI and 2025 trend evidence	aggregate trend/narrative mapping; AI evidence
<u>A18</u>	Dismislab 2024-08-08	Misinformation Spread in India about Communal Violence in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	contextual correction/source comparison
<u>A19</u>	Dismislab 2024-08-11	More Disinformation on Communal Violence in Bangladesh Spread on Twitter	Communal persecution	contextual correction/source comparison
<u>A20</u>	Dismislab 2024-08-13	Misleading Videos Spread False Claims of Communal Violence in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	temporal/visual verification; factual correction
<u>A21</u>	Dismislab 2024-08-29	How Disinformation Stoked Fear, Panic, and Confusion during Bangladesh's Student-Led Revolution	Transition violence/crisis confusion	contextual correction; crisis-information mapping
<u>A22</u>	Dismislab 2024-10-31	Political Shift Triggers Surge in Political and Religious Misinformation in Bangladesh	Aggregate context / political and religious misinformation	aggregate trend/narrative mapping
<u>A23</u>	Dismislab 2025-07-30	AI-Generated Videos Burst into Political Campaign amid Surge in Election Misinformation	Election manipulation	AI detection; election misinformation mapping

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
<u>A24</u>	Dismislab 2025-10-29	Political Misinformation Peaks as False Claims of Rallies and Election Narratives Rise	Election manipulation	source mapping; election narrative tracking
<u>A25</u>	Dismislab 2025-11-30	Fake Election Narratives Target Social Media Users	Election manipulation	source mapping; election narrative tracking
<u>A26</u>	BSS 2024-12-06	49 Indian Media Outlets Run 13 False Reports on Bangladesh	Aggregate context / Indian media false-report scale	official report of false Indian media coverage
<u>A27</u>	BSS 2024-12-11	72% Accounts Spreading Anti-Bangladesh Misinformation Located in India: Rumor Scanner	Aggregate context / India-based account geography	account-location/context evidence
<u>A28</u>	BSS 2025-01-01	CA Press Wing Debunks Indian Zeenews Report on Prof. Yunus	Legitimacy attack	factual correction
<u>A29</u>	BSS 2025-01-02	CA Press Wing Debunks Post on Hindus' Job Banning	Communal persecution	factual correction; identity correction
<u>A30</u>	BSS 2025-01-13	CA Press Wing Debunks India Today Report on Turkish Tanks	Security threat	institutional rebuttal; defence-policy denial
<u>A31</u>	BSS 2025-01-30	CA Press Wing Debunks Indian Weekly's Report Involving Bangladesh-US Ties	Legitimacy attack	institutional rebuttal; document/source clarification
<u>A32</u>	BSS 2025-02-07	CA Press Wing Debunks India.com Report on Media Censorship	Media censorship	institutional rebuttal; contextual correction

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A33	BSS 2025-03-02	CA Press Wing Debunks Indian Newspaper The Tribune's Report	Legitimacy attack	institutional rebuttal; source clarification
A34	BSS 2025-05-06	Press Wing Debunks The Hindu Report on Targeting of Journalists	Media censorship	institutional rebuttal; contextual correction
A35	BSS 2025-05-04	Press Wing Debunks Indian Media Report on Chief Adviser	Legitimacy attack	institutional rebuttal; source clarification
A36	BSS 2025-05-20	Indian Media Outlets' Report about Greater Bangladesh Map Is Fake: BanglaFact	Security threat	institutional rebuttal; map authentication
A37	BSS 2025-06-30	CA Press Wing Debunks Video of Elderly Hindu Man Humiliation	Communal persecution	temporal/visual verification; factual correction; identity correction
A38	BSS 2025-07-14	Indian Media Publishes False Reports over Slain Lal Chand	Communal persecution	factual correction
A39	BSS 2025-06-14	Press Wing Bins Claim of Bangladesh's Plan to Change Its National Flag	Cultural tension	institutional rebuttal; symbol/context correction
A40	AFP Fact Check 2026-02-10	Flood of Disinformation Ahead of Bangladesh Election	Election manipulation	election fact-checking; source tracing; AI/context checks
A41	AFP Fact Check 2026-01-04	Altered Video of UN Human Rights Chief Misleads Online	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A42	AFP Fact Check 2026-02-11	Baseless Claims That Bangladesh Vote Postponement Mislead Online	Election manipulation	factual correction; election timeline verification
A43	AFP Fact Check 2025-12-08	Bangladesh Road Rage Incident Misrepresented as an Attack on Yunus Press Secretary	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification
A44	AFP Fact Check 2025-06-24	Video of Trump Lauding Bangladesh Leader Is Manipulated	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification
A45	AFP Fact Check 2024-12-12	Fabricated Bangladesh Government Congratulatory Note to Trump Circulates Online	Legitimacy attack	document/source verification
A46	AFP Fact Check 2025-09-12	Old Bangladesh Unrest Clip Falsely Shared as Recent	Transition violence	temporal/visual verification
A47	AFP Fact Check 2025-03-12	Footage of Myanmar Ethnic Group Scuffle Misrepresented as Bangladesh Army Clash	Security threat	temporal/visual verification
A48	AFP Fact Check 2026-01-23	Claim of Bangladeshi Cricketer Calling for Boycott of Indian League Shares Fabricated Video	Cultural tension	temporal/visual verification; document/source verification; identity correction
A49	FactWatch 2024-09-17	Fake Resignation Letter Attributed to Muhammad Yunus	Legitimacy attack	document/source verification

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Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A50	FactWatch 2025-12-07	AI Image Shared as “Step Down Yunus” Poster in Delhi	Legitimacy attack	technological correction/AI detection; temporal/visual verification
A51	FactWatch 2025-04-10	Fake Prothom Alo Photocard Claims Dr. Yunus Spoke of Sending Troops to Palestine	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification
A52	FactWatch 2025-04-08	Distorted Photo Circulated Claiming Dr. Yunus and Netanyahu Handshake	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification
A53	FactWatch 2026-02-10	Brazilian Footballer, Bangladeshi Politicians, and Media Personalities Impersonated in an AI Financial Scam	Election manipulation / AI fraud context	technological correction/AI scam verification
A54	News-checker Bangladesh 2025-01-02	False Claim of a Hindu Woman Being Gang-Raped in Bangladesh Goes Viral	Communal persecution	factual correction; identity correction
A55	News-checker Bangladesh 2025-05-21	Viral Statement Attributed to Donald Trump Praising Dr. Yunus Is Created with AI	Legitimacy attack	technological correction/AI detection
A56	News-checker Bangladesh 2025-05-05	Video of Bangladesh Police Falsely Linked to Pakistani Generals with Dr. Yunus	Security threat	identity correction; video verification
A57	News-checker Bangladesh 2025-07-29	Bangladesh Police Forcibly Converting a Hindu Boy to Islam? False	Communal persecution	identity correction

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A58	News-checker Bangladesh 2025-12-15	Claim of Dr. Yunus Visiting Hospital to See Khaleda Zia Circulates Old Video	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification
A59	News-checker Bangladesh 2025	Woman Accused of Drunk Driving in Viral Video Is Not Dr. Yunus’s Daughter	Legitimacy attack	temporal/visual verification; identity correction
A60	BOOM 2025-07-05	False Claim: Image Shows Hindu Woman Raped and Killed in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	temporal/visual verification; factual correction; identity correction
A61	The Daily Star 2024-08-12	Attacks on Minorities: BBC, Dismislab Debunk Fake News	Communal persecution	contextual correction/source comparison
A62	Dhaka Tribune 2024-08-12	BBC Verify Uncovers Misinformation about Hindu Persecution in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	identity correction
A63	VOA 2024-08-28	Fact-Checkers Question Accounts of Anti-Hindu Violence in Bangladesh	Communal persecution	identity correction
A64	Al Jazeera 2024-08-08	Islamophobic, Alarmist: How Some Indian Outlets Covered the Bangladesh Crisis	Media discourse / cross-border framing context	newsroom analysis of Indian media framing
A65	AFP Fact Check 2024-08-15	Video Shows Restaurant Set on Fire in Bangladesh, Not Hindu Temple	Communal persecution	temporal/visual verification; identity correction

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
<u>A66</u>	AFP Fact Check 2024-12-24	Charity Video from Bangla- desh Falsely Shared as Hindu Monk Forced to Con- vert to Islam	Communal perse- cution	temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; identity correction
<u>A67</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-01-27	False Report: Bangladesh Banned Indian TV Fans Ten- sions	Media censorship	procedural/ contextual correction; source con- firmation
<u>A68</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-01-10	Clip of Vandal- ised Mosque in India Falsely Linked to At- tack against Minorities in Bangladesh	Communal perse- cution	temporal/ visual verifica- tion
<u>A69</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-05-27	Video Shows Home Dem- olition in Bangladesh, Not Vandalism Targeting For- mer MP	Transition violence	temporal/ visual verifica- tion
<u>A70</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-06-05	Clip Shows Brawl over Mining Dis- pute, Not Ex- tremist Hindus Attacking Bangladeshi Nationals	Cultural tension / bilateral hostility	temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; identity correction
<u>A71</u>	AFP Fact Check 2026-01-11	Video of Ban- gladeshi Hindu Appealing for India's Help Is AI-Generated	Communal perse- cution	technolog- ical cor- rection/AI detection; temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; identity correction
<u>A72</u>	AFP Fact Check 2026-01-13	Video of Man Attacked at Indian Train Station False- ly Linked to Anti-Hindu Violence in Bangladesh	Communal perse- cution	temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; identity correction

Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
<u>A73</u>	AFP Fact Check 2026-01-29	Damaged Bust of Indian In- dependence Leader False- ly Linked to Anti-Hindu Violence in Bangladesh	Cultural tension	temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; identity correction
<u>A74</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-12-18	Indian Content Creator's Video Falsely Shared as Assault on Bangladesh Political Party Member	Transition violence	temporal/ visual verifica- tion
<u>A75</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-08-14	Baseless Claims Ex-US Envoy Visited Bangladesh Share Forged Document	Legitima- cy attack	document verification; forged-docu- ment correc- tion
<u>A76</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-12-02	Bangladeshi Police Say Video of Offi- cers Revealing Political Plot Is AI-Generated	Election manipula- tion	techno- logical correction/ AI detec- tion; police/ source con- firmation
<u>A77</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-12-14	Manipulat- ed Image of Bangladesh Student Leader Stokes False Pakistan Nar- rative	Security threat	image/doc- ument ma- nipulation check
<u>A78</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-10-21	Video Shows Thai-Cambodi- an Border Tem- ple Argument, Not Incursion into Bangla- desh	Security/ border tension	location verification; border-con- text correc- tion
<u>A79</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-03-25	Old Video from India Falsely Shared as Lo- cals Fighting Robbers in Bangladesh	Transition violence	temporal/ visual verifica- tion
<u>A80</u>	AFP Fact Check 2025-10-05	Videos Show Unrest in Nepal and In- donesia, Not Bangladesh	Transition violence	temporal/ visual verifica- tion

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Item	Source/ date	Corpus item or claim	Dominant frame/ role	Count- er-frame/ evidence type
A81	AFP Fact Check 2025-10-29	Scripted Video Misrepresented as Genuine Bangladesh Election Vio- lence	Election manipula- tion	contextual correction; scripted-vid- eo verifica- tion
A82	AFP Fact Check 2025-03-04	Video of Burn- ing Indonesian Compound Sparks False Claims Linked to Bangladesh Tensions	Contextu- al verifica- tion report	temporal/vi- sual verifica- tion; factual correction
A83	AFP Fact Check 2025-12-29	Video of Stu- dent's Arrest in Bangladesh Falsely Shared in Political Context	Transition violence	temporal/ visual verifi- cation

Source: Author's coding of the analytical corpus. Note. The item numbers in the first column are linked to the original online sources. The "dominant frame/role" column separates direct misinformation examples from background, trend, and institutional context items.

APPENDIX B: CODING GUIDE, CODEBOOK, AND AUDIT TRAIL

Table B1 summarises the coding scheme applied to all 83 corpus items. The codebook combines deductive categories from information disorder, framing theory, strategic narrative, and the fact-checking literature with inductive subcategories that emerged from close reading. A coding memo recorded the India-link criterion, frame decision, counter-frame decision, evidence type, and difficult judgment notes for each item.

Table B1. *Coding Guide Used in the Qualitative Analysis*

Variable	Coding Categories	Meaning in This Study
India-link criterion	Indian media outlet; India-based or India-facing social media amplification; Indian minority/security/bilateral discourse; identified by fact-checker as Indian media/platform circulation	Operational test used before an item could enter the coded corpus
Claim topic	Communal; Yunus/government; security; media; election; transition violence; sport/culture	Primary issue area of the misinformation item

Variable	Coding Categories	Meaning in This Study
Claim type	False; misleading; altered; AI-generated; old video/image; wrong identity; fake photocard/document; fabricated statement; manipulated audio/video	Technical form through which misinformation is constructed
Frame-construction cues	Headline logic; lexical label; victim/perpetrator identity; visual evidence; source attribution; temporal placement; implied remedy	Discursive evidence used to move beyond thematic categorisation
Dominant frame	Communal persecution; legitimacy attack; security threat; media censorship; election manipulation; transition violence; cultural tension	Main interpretive meaning of the false claim as a political message
Counter-frame	Factual correction; contextual correction; identity correction; temporal correction; technological correction; institutional rebuttal	Strategy used by Bangladeshi or international actors to challenge the claim
Source type	Independent fact-checker; professional newsroom; international fact-checker; official/institutional rebuttal; mixed source	Used to avoid treating all counter-framers as equally independent
Evidence type	Reverse image/video search; official statement; police/source contact; archive check; AI detection; document comparison; platform trace	Kind of proof used to repair the public record
Theoretical role	Information disorder; framing; strategic narrative; networked propaganda; epistemic repair	Primary theoretical connection made in the analysis
Memo note	Ambiguous frame decision; duplicate claim cluster; source limitation; triangulation note; unresolved uncertainty	Audit-trail field used to increase transparency in a single-coder design

Source: Author's codebook and audit-trail record.